Under the proposed setup, Sentora’s interface will be entrusted with Aave’s lending risk controls, while suppliers take on the financial impact of Hub losses.
Under the upcoming Ethereum lending market framework, the associated contracts would be held by the Aave DAO, yet Sentora retains full authority over daily credit risk choices.
Through a governance proposal published on September 28, the decentralized finance risk manager requests permission to run an isolated Aave V4 Hub alongside its lending Spokes via revocable permissions. This division is placed immediately into Sentora’s hands for fast risk mitigation, leaving the decentralized autonomous organization holding overall ownership, a review mechanism for fresh markets, and the authority to revoke those assignments.
Sentora would select its own collateral assets, interest-rate curves, liquidation parameters, and oracle feeds. Meanwhile, no monitoring assignment for the instance, change recommendation, or incident response would be held by Aave’s current risk service providers.
The proposal remains an Aave Request for Comments open for community discussion, while subsequent phases encompass a Snapshot ballot and an on-chain Aave Improvement Proposal before approval is granted.
Who Has Authority to Act and When
Aave V4 separates the liquidity-holding Hub from the collateral-backed loan Spokes. Sentora proposes a single Ethereum Hub for its Spokes, maintaining isolated credit lines free from other Aave DAO Hubs, while its individual Spokes will be supplied directly by contributors within Sentora’s Hub.
Borrowing privileges under the proposal are restricted exclusively to RLUSD, PYUSD, and OUSD, while leaving out major stables like USDC and USDT.
Under the plan, administrative roles over the Hub, Spokes, and AccessManager will be retained by the DAO’s Governance Short Executor. The organization maintains control over contract upgrades and role grants, while Sentora holds ownership of none of the contracts.
Instead, operational roles to manage the markets would be assigned to it, and those grants could be revoked by the DAO via an on-chain governance proposal.
A forty-eight-hour waiting period is enforced for risk expansions and ambiguous functions, such as interest rate models and liquidation parameters. Furthermore, the proposal establishes zero restrictions regarding the scale of any increase, alongside no mandatory cooldown intervals between consecutive updates.
While the waiting period allows a scheduled action to be displayed publicly, the DAO holds no mechanism to cancel that specific execution during the timeframe. Stripping Sentora of its permissions would necessitate a separate on-chain governance proposal, which terminates its authority moving forward.
Prior to launching a fresh Hub or collateral asset, Sentora would publish a detailed evaluation and wait two weeks. If an objection is raised by any designated Aave DAO service provider, the deployment would halt and proceed to a binding Snapshot ballot.
The submission text further notes that no service provider has been assigned or funded to evaluate these filings. Additionally, the instance is excluded from the monitoring, parameter recommendation, and incident response duties of those providers.
While providers could voice concerns independently, an uneventful review period does not guarantee that the modification was closely inspected by anyone. The suggested veto mechanism relies entirely on an individual identifying an issue and deciding to object.
During November 2025, Sentora chief executive Anthony DeMartino contended via an essay that professional risk oversight requires quantifiable guardrails alongside ongoing tracking. Under the new proposal, that operational duty would be delegated to Sentora, allowing the DAO’s service providers the freedom to voice opinions without being bound to monitor the market.
Who Covers the Shortfall?
If a liquidation depletes a borrower’s collateral while a balance still lingers, the shortage is reported by the Spoke to the Hub that provided the debt asset. The Hub logs the deficit against that particular asset, and according to TokenLogic’s V4 Umbrella proposal, those losses must be absorbed by suppliers of that Hub asset.
A separate ledger identifies the Spoke that originated it, and the absence of cross-Hub credit lines would prevent a direct draw on other DAO Hubs for this instance’s loans. However, protection is not provided to suppliers inside Sentora’s Hub from its own individual Spokes.
Under the suggested commercial arrangement, 50% of the platform’s revenue is allocated to Sentora while the remaining half goes to the DAO, encompassing both reserve-factor earnings and protocol liquidation charges.
A separate Aave V4 Umbrella ARFC outlines deficit offsets and staked coverage options tailored for Core WETH, Core USDC, and Core USDT. However, Sentora’s proposed Hub is not included within that protection scope, and its own ARFC establishes no Umbrella market, shortfall offset, or Sentora-financed first-loss layer.
While a future proposal might address this gap, coverage cannot be inferred by a lender from either the DAO’s contract ownership or its fee-sharing arrangement.
Sentora’s narrative states that USDe and PST will be utilized to back initial RLUSD yield loans, with PRIME and mWIN integrated subsequently, whereas its technical specification lists all four assets. Furthermore, its Bluechip description cites RLUSD borrowing against kBTC, yet the underlying table features RLUSD, PYUSD, and OUSD.
Selection of the OUSD oracle remains pending prior to the launch. Ultimately, the chosen assets and price feeds will shape the risk profile shouldered by liquidity suppliers.
For the DAO, the fundamental choice facing voters ahead of any Snapshot or AIP involves determining whether these operational privileges should be granted without an assigned independent monitor or any declared first-loss protection for the isolated Hub.
For prospective lenders, the final token roster, chosen oracles, and any explicit shortfall insurance will dictate the exact level of exposure resting behind those DAO-controlled contract keys.
